The Buffalo Billion Boondoggle

Introduction

New York State poured $959 million into a solar-panel manufacturing plant in Buffalo, promoted as the cornerstone of the state’s Buffalo Billion and a model for high-tech economic renewal. [1] The project was meant to create thousands of advanced-manufacturing jobs, attract new industry to western New York, and demonstrate how public investment could drive a clean-energy future.

What emerged instead was a publicly financed facility that never met its goals. The promised high-tech jobs became mostly data-annotation and assembly work. The solar-manufacturing equipment—purchased for $240 million—was sold for scrap at nineteen cents on the dollar. [2] A 2019 state audit found the project returned only fifty-four cents in economic benefit for every public dollar spent.[3] Nearly all of the state’s $959 million investment was written off.[1]

Tesla now leases the factory and remaining equipment for one dollar per year. [4] The facility functions largely to preserve head-count targets rather than produce solar panels,[5] while Buffalo’s hoped-for economic revitalization never arrived. Construction firms with political ties, state officials who gained publicity, and Tesla itself all retained their advantages. Taxpayers absorbed the loss.

The Buffalo solar factory is more than a failed project. It is a dramatic demonstration of how public risk and private capture can be engineered into economic-development policy. The sections that follow trace how that structure formed, who benefited at each stage, and why failure was its predictable outcome.


The Buffalo Billion Promise

In 2014, Governor Andrew Cuomo launched the Buffalo Billion—a $1 billion economic-development initiative intended to revive western New York’s economy through state-led investment. [6] Its flagship project would be a state-owned solar-panel manufacturing plant on the Buffalo River, envisioned as the largest in the Western Hemisphere. The factory would symbolize a clean-energy future, create 3,000 high-tech manufacturing jobs in Buffalo and 5,000 statewide, and demonstrate that government could catalyze private innovation.[7]

Under the plan, New York would build the 1.2-million-square-foot facility and purchase all manufacturing equipment. SolarCity, founded by Elon Musk’s cousins Lyndon and Peter Rive, would lease the plant for one dollar per year and operate it as a solar-panel production hub. [8] Cuomo placed the project under the direction of Alain Kaloyeros, president of SUNY Polytechnic Institute and chief architect of the state’s high-tech investment strategy.

Before construction was even complete, two developments reshaped the project. In 2015 the state quietly amended its agreement with SolarCity: the definition of “high-tech” jobs disappeared, the number of required manufacturing positions dropped from 900 to 500, and oversight language weakened. [9] That same period also brought a corporate shift with lasting consequences—Elon Musk moved to acquire SolarCity through Tesla, turning the publicly funded Buffalo plant into an asset of his company before it had produced a single panel.[10–13] Whether that outcome was foreseen or merely convenient, it ensured that control of the state’s billion-dollar investment would pass to Tesla once construction ended.

The amended contract and the impending takeover set the pattern that would define the Buffalo project: the state assumed the cost and risk, while private partners retained flexibility and future gains.


The Public Paid

Every dollar that built Buffalo’s solar factory came from the public. Every decision about how to spend it came from state officials. New York committed $959 million in taxpayer funds—about $350 million for construction, $240 million for solar-manufacturing equipment, and the remainder for site preparation and ancillary costs. [14]

A fiduciary decision prioritizes the financial interests of the people whose money is being spent. These were were political decisions, not fiduciary ones. The state agencies directing the Buffalo Billion program—Empire State Development and SUNY Polytechnic Institute—used public funds to build and equip a facility that would then be leased to SolarCity, and later Tesla, for one dollar per year. [15] The company has no obligation to repay the capital costs and faced only minimal penalties if job targets were missed.[16]

The structure guaranteed that the public carried all risk while private interests retained all flexibility. If the venture failed, taxpayers would absorb the loss; if it succeeded, Tesla would capture the gains. By separating financial responsibility from financial control, the state created the conditions for the extraction that followed.


Construction

The construction phase turned public funds into private gains. While New York officials promoted the Buffalo solar factory as a symbol of renewal, the real project advanced behind closed doors—through quiet contract revisions, politically connected developers, and decisions that reshaped the deal long before a single panel was produced.

Two firms, LPCiminelli and COR Development, received the principal construction contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars. [17] Both had been major contributors to Governor Cuomo’s campaigns, donating between $150,000 and $225,000.[19] The bid requirements were written with extraordinary specificity: the request for proposals demanded a developer with “fifty years of local experience,” a description that fit LPCiminelli precisely and excluded almost everyone else.[18] These were political decisions, not fiduciary ones.

Federal prosecutors later determined that the process had been rigged to steer contracts to favored companies. In 2018, Alain Kaloyeros, head of SUNY Polytechnic and Cuomo’s chief economic-development official, was convicted of bid rigging. [17] In 2023, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction on procedural grounds, and prosecutors have indicated plans to retry the case.[20] By that point, the public had already paid and the private parties had already collected. LPCiminelli captured roughly $25 million in proceeds from the RiverBend contract, and COR Development executives about $8 million each.[21]

As construction wrapped up, the project’s corporate foundation collapsed. SolarCity, the original lessee, was deep in debt and losing cash. In 2016, Tesla announced plans to acquire the company, closing the deal before the Buffalo factory even opened. [22] The acquisition transferred control of a nearly billion-dollar, taxpayer-funded facility—and $240 million in state-purchased equipment—to Tesla for a lease of one dollar per year. The change was legal and publicly filed but never emphasized in the state’s announcements or press events. While officials celebrated the arrival of a world-famous innovator, they did not mention that the plant’s purpose, ownership, and risk profile had already shifted.[23]

By the time the factory opened, the transfer was complete. Developers had secured guaranteed profits; Tesla had inherited a fully built, debt-free facility; and Governor Cuomo had banked political credit for bringing “high-tech jobs” to Buffalo. The public, having financed every stage, owned a facility whose economic purpose was already dissolving.


Job Requirement Manipulation

When Tesla acquired SolarCity, it also inherited the Buffalo factory’s job-creation mandate and a $290 million penalty clause for failing to meet it. [24] Internal due-diligence reports later showed that Tesla even considered paying that penalty and abandoning Buffalo altogether before concluding that the political cost would be too high.[29] The company never built the solar-manufacturing operation that the state had financed, but it learned how to satisfy the letter of its contract without fulfilling the purpose.

The original agreement promised 3,000 high-tech jobs in Buffalo and 5,000 statewide. By 2015—before the factory opened—the state had already amended those terms. The definition of “high-tech” work disappeared, and the number of required manufacturing positions fell from 900 to 500. [25] The new standard allowed almost any on-site employment to count toward compliance.

Tesla used that flexibility to meet its quota on paper. By the end of 2021, the company reported 1,460 total jobs, just over the revised requirement. [26] About a third of those workers performed data annotation for Tesla’s Autopilot software—labeling images and video to train self-driving systems. These were entry-level clerical positions, not advanced-manufacturing or clean-energy jobs. Another several hundred assembled Supercharger components for Tesla’s vehicle network, while roughly 300 to 400 employees worked on solar-related tasks.[27]

Employment at the facility has fluctuated between 1,600 and 1,800, enough to maintain formal compliance and avoid penalties. [28] The numbers remain technically accurate and substantively misleading. The Buffalo factory exists as a workplace but not as the manufacturing center taxpayers funded.


Product Failure

The Buffalo factory never became the solar-manufacturing hub New York had paid for. Production goals that once defined the project’s promise were quietly abandoned as the equipment aged and the technology moved on. The product had struggled from the start—the Solar Roof prototype unveiled in 2016 was later revealed to have been a nonfunctional mock-up built to bolster investor confidence before Tesla’s acquisition of SolarCity. [35–38]

Panasonic, Tesla’s partner in solar manufacturing, withdrew from the venture in 2020, citing lack of profitability and weak demand. [30] Tesla’s Solar Roof, unveiled years earlier as the centerpiece product for the Buffalo plant, remained at a “nascent” stage—incapable of mass production. Even the company’s own installations fell far short of projections: around 21 roofs per week, compared with the promised 1,000.[31]

The factory’s operations shifted toward other uses. Tesla repurposed portions of the facility for Supercharger assembly, data operations, and other internal projects unrelated to solar energy. The solar-manufacturing equipment, purchased by the state for roughly $240 million, became obsolete for its intended purpose. Between 2020 and 2021, New York State sold or scrapped nearly all of it. At public auction, machinery originally bought for $207 million brought in $39 million—about nineteen cents on the dollar. [32] The rest was recycled, scrapped, or transferred to other sites. The state retained about $32 million in usable assets.[33] Some equipment was trucked to a scrap yard in Corfu after months in storage that cost the state roughly $250,000.[39–42]

In a further irony, Tesla later installed Chinese-manufactured LONGi solar panels on the Buffalo factory’s roof rather than panels made at the site. [34]

The Buffalo plant still operates, but its mission is unrecognizable. Tesla occupies a publicly funded facility—leased for one dollar per year—that was built for renewable-energy manufacturing and now serves corporate logistics and component assembly. What was once presented as a cornerstone of New York’s clean-energy strategy functions instead as a subsidized workspace for private enterprise.


Audit Results

The state’s own audits confirmed what the project’s outcomes had already made visible: New York’s billion-dollar solar venture produced losses rather than returns. A 2019 audit by the State Comptroller found that for every public dollar spent on the Buffalo factory, the state received only fifty-four cents of economic benefit. Successful economic-development projects typically generate about thirty dollars in returns for each dollar invested. The Buffalo facility performed ninety-eight percent worse than that standard.\[1\]

Independent auditors had already written down the investment the previous year. In 2018, New York recorded an $884 million loss, acknowledging that nearly the entire $959 million commitment had lost its value.\[13\] Depending on the measurement method and timing, the cost per job ranged from $525,000 to $959,000—levels far beyond any rational standard for job creation.

These numbers did not come from critics or opponents; they came from the state’s own accountability mechanisms. The audits did not uncover a hidden failure—they certified a public one. And by the time those findings were released, the political and financial beneficiaries had already moved on.


Political Benefits

Governor Cuomo’s administration gained politically from the Buffalo project long before the audits revealed its failure. The Buffalo Billion program was designed as an economic-development showcase, and the solar factory became its centerpiece. Cuomo announced the project, held press events during construction, and later stood beside Tesla executives to celebrate the factory’s opening. These appearances generated headlines, speeches, and campaign material that reinforced his image as a champion of upstate renewal.

The rewards were immediate and risk-free. Political credit accumulated at the announcement stage, while accountability lagged years behind. By the time audits documented the losses, the narrative of success had already served its purpose. For the governor and his allies, the project’s real value lay not in production or employment but in publicity—the visible evidence of investment and ambition, regardless of outcome.\[2\]

The political structure mirrored the financial one: benefits were captured early and insulated from reversal. The same pattern that protected corporate and contractor gains also protected political reputations. Audit findings were delayed until after key public statements and appearances.


Extraction Pattern

The Buffalo solar factory illustrates how wealth extraction can occur through official channels rather than overt corruption. Public officials authorized nearly a billion dollars in spending, structured in ways that guaranteed the public would bear all risk. Developers with political ties secured contracts that could not lose money. Tesla acquired state-built assets for almost nothing, repurposed them for its own use, and met its obligations through technical compliance rather than performance.

Each stage of the project followed the same logic: public cost, private gain, and political credit. The construction phase rewarded connected firms; the operational phase rewarded a corporation able to redefine success; and the political phase rewarded officials who could present each announcement as progress. When the system failed, none of those beneficiaries were required to return what they had gained.

Whether any participant intended fraud is secondary. The structure itself ensured the outcome. Once public money was committed without enforceable accountability, extraction was not a risk—it was the predictable result.


Current Status

As of 2025, the Buffalo factory continues to operate under Tesla’s lease of one dollar per year. The company briefly announced plans to manufacture Dojo supercomputers and other components at the site—projects unrelated to solar energy—but those plans were later canceled.\[14\]

Employment at the facility remains between 1,600 and 1,800, sufficient to maintain contractual compliance though far below the original vision for a large-scale solar-manufacturing hub.\[15\] A limited number of employees continue to assemble Solar Roof materials, but mass production never materialized.

New York State still owns a facility that cost taxpayers $959 million and has returned only fifty-four cents for every public dollar spent. The solar-manufacturing equipment that once justified the investment has been sold for scrap, and the “high-tech” jobs that were supposed to transform Buffalo’s economy largely exist in clerical or assembly work.

Tesla retains a publicly funded industrial complex at negligible cost. The developers who built it have been paid. The officials who promoted it have moved on. What remains is a case study in how an economic-development program became a mechanism for wealth transfer—from the public that financed it to the private interests that captured it.

We note that while the flagship project failed, some smaller Buffalo Billion initiatives had modest success.


References

  1. New York State Comptroller. Audit 2017-S-60: Empire State Development – Buffalo Billion and SolarCity. Office of the State Comptroller (2018).
  2. Spectrum News 1 Buffalo. (2021, Nov 15). State recovers fraction of Tesla equipment cost.
  3. Wagner, J. (2016, May 12). SolarCity slashes Buffalo factory commitment. Investigative Post.
  4. Empire Center staff. (2016, Jun 28). Solar Subsidy. Empire Center for Public Policy.
  5. Vielkind, J. (2016, Sep 26). Cuomo will ‘set aside’ campaign contributions from developers. Politico.
  6. U.S. Department of Justice. (2018, Dec 11). Former State University President Alain Kaloyeros and three corporate executives sentenced to prison for fraud in connection with Buffalo Billion bid-rigging.
  7. Yassin, M. (2024, Aug 13). New Tesla deal slashes penalties, ups rent. Investigative Post.
  8. Colias, T., & De Avila, J. (2023, Jul 6). New York State built Elon Musk a $1 billion factory: ‘It was a bad bet.’ Wall Street Journal.
  9. Ballaban, M. (2023, Jul 6). Nearly half of Tesla’s Buffalo solar panel factory staff aren’t working on solar panels. Jalopnik.
  10. Wagner, J. (2023, Apr 2). Report details Tesla’s solar struggles. Investigative Post.
  11. Soave, R. (2023, Jul 6). Tesla solar factory not living up to New York’s $1 billion investment. Reason.
  12. Investigative Post. (2024, Mar 19). Did Tesla put a rival company’s solar panels on its Buffalo factory?
  13. Fort Schuyler Management Corporation. (2018, Jun 29). Consolidated financial statements and independent auditors’ report, year ended June 30, 2018.
  14. Scripps Media, Inc. (2025, Jul 21). ‘I’m sick of it’: Advocates urge New York to rethink Tesla deal in South Buffalo. WKBW.
  15. Buffalo Post. (2022, Feb 1). How Tesla built its Buffalo workforce beyond solar to dodge a big state penalty. The Buffalo News.

The Homeland Security Gold Rush: $165 Billion in “Emergency” Funding

The Homeland Security Gold Rush: How $165 Billion in “Emergency” Funding Bypasses Oversight

In July 2025, Congress passed what President Trump called the “One Big Beautiful Bill,” allocating an unprecedented $165 billion over the next decade to the Department of Homeland Security.[1] The massive funding surge, justified as essential for border security and national defense, has triggered what industry observers describe as a contractor “gold rush”—with companies flooding DHS agencies with proposals while normal competitive bidding processes are bypassed in the name of urgency.

Seven months into this spending spree, a clear pattern has emerged: emergency justifications are being used to award massive no-bid contracts to established players, while the sheer volume of available funding has overwhelmed the government’s capacity to provide meaningful oversight. The result is a system where taxpayer dollars flow rapidly to private contractors with minimal competition, limited transparency, and questionable accountability measures.

This analysis examines how the 2025 homeland security spending surge operates in practice—revealing a procurement system where “urgent and compelling” needs routinely override competitive processes, where agencies lack sufficient staff to evaluate contractor proposals, and where some of the largest contracts are awarded to companies with significant conflicts of interest.

The Scope of the 2025 Spending Surge

Unprecedented Scale and Speed

The $165 billion DHS allocation represents the largest single expansion of homeland security funding since the department’s creation in 2002.[2] Unlike traditional budget increases that develop over multiple fiscal years, this funding was designed for rapid deployment, with $43.8 billion allocated for fiscal year 2026 alone—nearly 40% of DHS’s current annual budget.[3]

The funding concentrates heavily on three operational areas: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Coast Guard.[4] Within these agencies, priorities include immigration detention facilities, border wall construction, advanced surveillance technologies, law enforcement hiring, and what officials describe as “border security technology modernization.”[5]

Major 2025 Funding Categories:

  • $6.2 billion for CBP border security technologies and screening systems
  • $700 million for IT upgrades at ICE
  • Coast Guard fleet and facility modernization (amount undisclosed)
  • Enhanced Secret Service protective operations
  • State and local security capacity building for 2026 World Cup and 2028 Olympics

The Procurement Challenge

The rapid deployment timeline has created significant challenges for normal government procurement processes. Sonny Bhagowalia, CBP’s Chief Information Officer, acknowledged the problem directly: “We have a little backlog right now, because obviously, we’ve got a lot of money coming in. A lot of people want to meet us, and we don’t have enough staff in some areas.”[6]

This staffing shortage at the evaluation level coincides with unprecedented contractor interest. Rafael Borras, CEO of the Homeland Security & Defense Business Council, noted that “there’s still a lot of unknown, and industry is still waiting to get more detail” about how the funding will be allocated.[7] The combination of massive available funding and limited oversight capacity has created conditions ripe for expedited procurement processes that bypass normal competitive safeguards.

Case Studies in No-Bid Contracting

Palantir’s ImmigrationOS: $30 Million Without Competition

The most revealing example of 2025’s expedited contracting involves ICE’s $30 million award to Palantir Technologies for development of the “Immigration Lifecycle Operating System” (ImmigrationOS).[8] The contract, awarded in April 2025, illustrates how emergency justifications can override competitive bidding for substantial taxpayer expenditures.

The Sole-Source Justification: ICE’s contract justification document argues that the agency has an “urgent and compelling” need for the ImmigrationOS capabilities, making competitive bidding impossible.[9] The justification cites several factors:

  • Presidential Executive Orders requiring rapid immigration enforcement capabilities
  • Palantir’s existing infrastructure “already ingesting and processing data from multiple ICE, DHS, and external sources”
  • The need for a prototype by September 25, 2025—less than six months from contract award
  • Palantir’s “deep institutional knowledge of ICE operations over more than a decade of support”[10]

Technical Capabilities: ImmigrationOS is designed to provide three primary functions:

  1. Targeting and Enforcement Prioritization: Streamlining identification and apprehension of individuals prioritized for removal, including “violent criminals,” gang members, and visa overstays
  2. Self-Deportation Tracking: Providing “near real-time visibility” on individuals voluntarily leaving the United States
  3. Immigration Lifecycle Management: Making deportation logistics more efficient by improving identification and removal processes[11]

The Sole-Source Problem: While ICE argues that Palantir is uniquely qualified due to existing infrastructure and expertise, the sole-source award raises several concerns:

  • Vendor Lock-In: By building new capabilities on Palantir’s existing ICM (Investigative Case Management) system, ICE becomes increasingly dependent on a single vendor for critical enforcement operations
  • Cost Escalation: Without competitive pricing pressure, there’s limited mechanism to ensure cost-effectiveness of the $30 million initial investment or future expansions
  • Limited Innovation: Sole-source awards eliminate the possibility that other vendors might offer superior technical solutions or more cost-effective approaches

Peraton’s $2.685 Billion Cloud Contract: Scale Without Competition

Another significant 2025 award involves Peraton’s $2.685 billion contract to provide Data Center and Cloud Optimization (DCCO) support services to DHS over 10 years.[12] Awarded through a single-award indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) structure, the contract gives Peraton control over DHS’s entire “Hybrid Computing Environment”—including data centers, colocation sites, private cloud services, and commercial cloud integration.[13]

Scope of Work: Under the DCCO contract, Peraton will:

  • Manage and operate DHS’s hybrid computing infrastructure
  • Provide professional services to “automate, optimize, and modernize” across the computing environment
  • Deliver “best-in-class managed service solutions” for national security operations[14]

The Competition Question: While Peraton describes this as “new work,” the scale and duration of the contract—nearly $270 million annually over a decade—represents one of the largest IT service contracts in DHS history.[15] The single-award structure eliminates ongoing competitive pressure for performance or cost-effectiveness once the initial award is made.

Contract Cancellations and Market Manipulation

The Leidos-CISA Contract Reversal

One of the most revealing episodes in 2025’s contracting landscape involves the cancellation of Leidos’s $2.4 billion cybersecurity contract with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).[16] The contract saga illustrates how political changes can rapidly alter the contracting landscape, creating uncertainty for industry while potentially benefiting preferred vendors.

Timeline of Events:

  • February 2024: DHS awards Leidos the seven-year Agile Cybersecurity Technical Solutions (ACTS) contract worth $2.4 billion
  • January 2025: Competing bidder Nightwing challenges the award in U.S. Court of Federal Claims
  • May 2025: DHS cancels the entire ACTS contract, citing “organizational changes and changes in priorities” at CISA[17]

Official Justification: DHS claimed the contract cancellation was “unrelated to the protest” and instead resulted from the Trump administration’s reorganization of CISA, including budget cuts and mission changes.[18] The agency stated it was “conducting acquisition planning to determine the best means for fulfilling its future requirements.”[19]

Market Impact: The cancellation creates several concerning precedents:

  • Political Risk: Contractors must now factor in the possibility that major awards can be cancelled due to political transitions rather than performance issues
  • Preferred Vendor Advantage: Companies with closer political connections may benefit from contract restructuring during transition periods
  • Reduced Investment: Uncertainty about contract stability may discourage contractor investment in capabilities or infrastructure

Leidos’s Strategic Repositioning

Despite losing the CISA contract, Leidos has aggressively positioned itself for opportunities under the 2025 spending surge. During an August earnings call, CEO Thomas Bell emphasized the company’s “very receptive audience in the Department of Homeland Security around our capabilities that are ready to field now.”[20]

Bell’s comments reveal important aspects of the current procurement environment: “They’re not interested in PowerPoints and promises. They’re interested in seeing capabilities demonstrated and products that are in production.”[21] This preference for “proven” solutions further advantages established contractors while potentially excluding innovative approaches from newer companies.

Existing Leidos Contracts: Leidos maintains substantial DHS relationships despite the CISA contract loss:

  • $918 million Homeland Enterprise Information Technology Secure Services and Support (HEITS) contract for DHS network operations[22]
  • Various task orders under the IT Shared Services Center (ITSSC) vehicles
  • Ongoing support for Social Security Administration operations[23]

The Oversight Gap

Insufficient Evaluation Capacity

The most fundamental problem revealed by 2025’s contracting surge is the mismatch between available funding and government oversight capacity. CBP’s acknowledgment that it lacks “enough staff in some areas” to handle contractor proposals represents more than an administrative inconvenience—it indicates a system where procurement decisions may be made without adequate evaluation of alternatives or cost-effectiveness.[24]

Staffing vs. Workload:

  • DHS received $165 billion in new funding over 10 years
  • Agencies report being overwhelmed by contractor proposals
  • Evaluation teams remain at pre-surge staffing levels
  • Timeline pressures encourage expedited review processes

The “Urgent and Compelling” Loophole

Federal procurement regulations allow agencies to bypass competitive bidding when they can demonstrate “urgent and compelling” circumstances that make competition impractical.[25] The 2025 homeland security spending surge has seen extensive use of these exceptions, often justified by citing presidential executive orders or national security requirements.

Common Justification Patterns:

  • Presidential directives requiring rapid implementation
  • Existing vendor infrastructure that makes competition “impractical”
  • Timeline requirements that allegedly preclude competitive processes
  • Claims that only incumbent contractors possess necessary expertise or security clearances

The Accountability Problem: While emergency procurement authorities serve legitimate purposes, their extensive use in 2025 raises questions about oversight and cost control:

  • Limited competitive pressure on pricing
  • Reduced opportunity for innovation from alternative vendors
  • Potential for vendor lock-in through proprietary systems
  • Difficulty in measuring value-for-money without competitive benchmarks

Industry Concentration and Market Power

The Major Players

The 2025 contracting surge has primarily benefited a small number of established defense and homeland security contractors. Companies like Leidos, Peraton, Palantir, and their competitors dominate the major awards, reinforcing market concentration in critical government services.

Contractor Positioning Strategies: James Carroll, CEO of the Professional Services Council, observed that DHS has been “opening the aperture” toward industry ideas, with the government asking contractors to identify problems rather than specifying solutions.[26] This approach potentially gives established players with existing relationships significant advantages in shaping requirements.

Jason Hannah, vice president of homeland security and public safety at Peraton, emphasized the importance of “working together within industry to provide those solutions underneath the new acquisition strategy.”[27] This industry coordination, while potentially improving solutions, also raises questions about competitive dynamics and pricing.

Barriers to New Entrants

Several factors in the 2025 procurement environment create barriers for companies seeking to enter the homeland security contracting market:

Security Clearance Requirements: Many contracts require extensive personnel security clearances, favoring established contractors with pre-cleared workforces over newer companies that would need time to obtain clearances.

Existing Infrastructure Preferences: Agencies’ preference for solutions that integrate with existing systems advantages incumbent contractors while making it difficult for new entrants to compete on innovative approaches.

Scale Requirements: The size of many 2025 contracts ($30 million, $2.685 billion, etc.) may exceed the capacity of smaller companies, concentrating awards among large established firms.

Technical Concerns and Civil Liberties

Surveillance Infrastructure Expansion

The 2025 funding surge is significantly expanding government surveillance capabilities through private contractors. Palantir’s ImmigrationOS represents just one example of how contractor-built systems are creating new mechanisms for monitoring and tracking individuals.

Data Integration Scope: ImmigrationOS will integrate data from multiple sources including:

  • ICE and DHS databases
  • External government databases (passport records, Social Security files, IRS tax data)
  • Commercial data sources (license plate readers, private databases)
  • Real-time tracking systems for visa overstays and deportation compliance[28]

Civil Liberties Implications: The concentration of surveillance capabilities in private contractor systems raises several concerns:

  • Scope Creep: Systems designed for specific purposes may be expanded to broader surveillance applications
  • Data Security: Private contractors become custodians of sensitive personal information on millions of individuals
  • Accountability: When surveillance is conducted through contractor systems, oversight and redress mechanisms may be less clear
  • Mission Expansion: Capabilities built for immigration enforcement could potentially be applied to other law enforcement activities

The Palantir Conflict of Interest

A particularly concerning aspect of the ImmigrationOS contract involves potential conflicts of interest within the Trump administration. According to the American Immigration Council, Stephen Miller—the Trump administration’s chief architect of immigration policy—holds “a substantial financial stake in Palantir.”[29] This creates a situation where a key policy maker has a direct financial interest in contracts awarded to implement his policies.

The Policy-Profit Nexus:

  • Miller shapes immigration enforcement policies
  • Those policies create “urgent and compelling” needs for contractor solutions
  • Palantir receives no-bid contracts to fulfill those needs
  • Miller potentially benefits financially from the contract awards

This arrangement illustrates how the 2025 procurement environment may benefit individuals with both policy-making authority and financial interests in contractor outcomes.

Economic Analysis: Costs vs. Alternatives

Opportunity Cost Assessment

The $165 billion allocated to DHS represents a significant opportunity cost in terms of alternative uses for taxpayer funds. A rigorous cost-benefit analysis would compare the security benefits of contractor-implemented solutions against both the direct costs and alternative approaches.

Direct Cost Components:

  • Contract awards and administrative overhead
  • Government personnel costs for contract oversight
  • Infrastructure and facility costs
  • Ongoing maintenance and upgrade expenses

Alternative Approaches:

  • In-house government development of equivalent capabilities
  • Competitive procurement processes that might yield lower costs
  • Investment in alternative security approaches (e.g., diplomatic solutions, economic development)
  • Non-security uses of funding (infrastructure, education, healthcare)

Return on Investment Questions

While national security benefits are difficult to quantify, the 2025 contracting approach raises questions about whether taxpayers are receiving optimal value for their investment:

Efficiency Concerns:

  • No-bid contracts eliminate price competition that typically drives cost efficiency
  • Sole-source awards may reduce incentives for contractor innovation or cost control
  • Limited oversight capacity may allow cost overruns or performance issues to persist

Effectiveness Questions:

  • Whether contractor-implemented solutions achieve better security outcomes than alternatives
  • Whether rapid deployment timelines compromise system quality or effectiveness
  • Whether proprietary contractor systems create long-term dependencies that increase costs

International Comparisons and Best Practices

Alternative Procurement Models

Other countries with significant homeland security challenges have adopted different approaches to contractor relationships and procurement oversight:

United Kingdom:

  • Emphasis on framework contracts that allow multiple vendors to compete for specific tasks
  • Regular market testing to ensure competitive pricing
  • Strong oversight mechanisms for major contracts

Canada:

  • Requirement for detailed cost-benefit analysis before major sole-source awards
  • Regular competitive re-bidding for major service contracts
  • Public reporting requirements for contractor performance metrics

Australia:

  • Strict justification requirements for emergency procurement
  • Mandatory cooling-off periods for contractor personnel moving to government roles
  • Public disclosure of major contract terms and performance metrics

Lessons for U.S. Procurement Reform

International experience suggests several approaches that might improve U.S. homeland security contracting:

Enhanced Competition:

  • Breaking large contracts into smaller components that allow multiple vendors to participate
  • Regular re-competition of major service contracts
  • Requirements for innovative approaches from new entrants

Improved Oversight:

  • Adequate staffing for contract evaluation and monitoring
  • Standardized cost-benefit analysis requirements
  • Public reporting of contractor performance and value metrics

Conflict of Interest Prevention:

  • Clear restrictions on policy makers with financial interests in contractor outcomes
  • Mandatory disclosure of potential conflicts in procurement decisions
  • Independent oversight of major contract awards

Future Implications and Systemic Risks

Vendor Dependency Risks

The 2025 contracting approach is creating significant dependencies on private vendors for critical government functions. When agencies build new capabilities on contractor-proprietary systems, they become locked into long-term relationships that may be difficult or expensive to change.

Lock-In Mechanisms:

  • Proprietary data formats that make it difficult to switch vendors
  • Custom integrations that require specific contractor expertise to maintain
  • Security clearance requirements that limit alternative vendor options
  • Contract terms that give incumbent vendors advantages in re-competition

Political Transition Risks

The Leidos-CISA contract cancellation illustrates how contractor relationships can become casualty of political transitions. This creates several concerning dynamics:

Market Distortion:

  • Contractors may focus on political relationships rather than technical capabilities
  • Investment in long-term capabilities may be discouraged by political uncertainty
  • Contract awards may reflect political preferences rather than merit-based evaluation

Continuity Concerns:

  • Critical government capabilities may be disrupted by contractor changes
  • Institutional knowledge may be lost when vendors are replaced for political reasons
  • Costs may increase as new contractors recreate capabilities that were previously developed

Long-Term Cost Implications

While the $165 billion allocation covers 10 years, the actual long-term costs are likely to be significantly higher due to several factors:

Expansion Pressures:

  • Successful contractor systems often expand in scope and cost over time
  • New threats or policy priorities may require additional contractor capabilities
  • Maintenance and upgrade costs typically escalate over system lifespans

Competition Reduction:

  • Market concentration may reduce competitive pressure on pricing
  • Vendor lock-in effects may limit agencies’ ability to seek alternative solutions
  • Proprietary systems may require costly contractor support for routine operations

Conclusion: The Price of Expedited Security

The 2025 homeland security spending surge represents an unprecedented experiment in rapid government procurement—with $165 billion in taxpayer funds being allocated to private contractors through expedited processes that bypass many traditional oversight mechanisms. Seven months into this experiment, clear patterns have emerged that raise fundamental questions about cost-effectiveness, accountability, and long-term value for taxpayers.

The use of “urgent and compelling” justifications to avoid competitive bidding has become routine rather than exceptional. Major contracts worth tens of millions or billions of dollars are being awarded to single vendors based on claims that competition is impractical—often because incumbent contractors have built proprietary systems that make switching costs prohibitive. Meanwhile, agencies acknowledge they lack sufficient staff to properly evaluate the flood of contractor proposals generated by the funding surge.

The mathematical reality is stark: while DOGE claims to save billions through efficiency measures, the homeland security contractor surge is simultaneously directing hundreds of billions to private companies through processes with limited competitive pressure or oversight. The net effect is a government that costs significantly more while potentially reducing accountability and increasing dependency on private contractors for critical functions.

The case studies examined—from Palantir’s $30 million no-bid ImmigrationOS contract to Peraton’s $2.685 billion infrastructure deal—illustrate how emergency justifications and existing vendor relationships can override competitive processes that normally protect taxpayer interests. The cancellation and reallocation of the $2.4 billion Leidos-CISA contract demonstrates how contractor relationships can become political rather than merit-based, creating uncertainty that ultimately increases costs.

Perhaps most concerning is the concentration of surveillance and enforcement capabilities in private hands, often through sole-source arrangements with companies that have financial relationships with policy makers. When immigration enforcement infrastructure is built by companies with direct financial stakes in immigration policy, the traditional separation between public policy and private profit becomes blurred.

The 2025 approach to homeland security contracting prioritizes speed over scrutiny, incumbency over innovation, and political relationships over competitive merit. While rapid response to security challenges may sometimes justify expedited procurement, the systematic use of emergency authorities to avoid competitive oversight represents a fundamental departure from procurement practices designed to protect taxpayer interests.

International experience suggests that effective homeland security can be achieved through competitive procurement processes that maintain accountability while achieving operational objectives. The choice to bypass these processes in favor of sole-source arrangements with favored contractors represents a policy decision that prioritizes contractor relationships over cost-effectiveness or innovation.

As the remaining $165 billion in homeland security funding flows to contractors over the next decade, the patterns established in 2025 will likely determine whether taxpayers receive security capabilities worth their investment—or simply fund an expensive transfer of public resources to private companies with limited accountability for results. The current trajectory suggests the latter outcome is increasingly likely, making the 2025 homeland security contracting surge not just expensive, but potentially counterproductive to both fiscal responsibility and genuine security effectiveness.


Sources

[1] Federal News Network, “DHS prepares for unprecedented spending surge under ‘Big, Beautiful Bill’,” July 9, 2025 [2] Federal News Network, “Contractors angle for opportunities under DHS spending surge,” September 26, 2025 [3] Office of Management and Budget, “Fiscal Year 2026 Discretionary Budget Request,” May 2025 [4] Federal News Network, “Contractors angle for opportunities under DHS spending surge,” September 26, 2025 [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid. [7] Ibid. [8] Immigration Policy Tracking Project, “Palantir granted $30 million to build ‘ImmigrationOS’ surveillance platform for ICE,” September 25, 2025 [9] OrangeSlices AI, “DHS ICE awards Immigration Lifecycle Operating System (ImmigrationOS) prototype contract to Palantir,” 2025 [10] Ibid. [11] Immigration Policy Tracking Project, “Palantir granted $30 million to build ‘ImmigrationOS’ surveillance platform for ICE,” September 25, 2025 [12] Peraton, “Peraton Awarded $2.685 Billion Contract to Provide Data Center and Cloud Optimization Support Services to U.S. Department of Homeland Security,” April 21, 2023 [13] Ibid. [14] Ibid. [15] Ibid. [16] The Register, “DHS pulls $2.4B Leidos CISA deal after rival calls foul,” May 14, 2025 [17] Washington Technology, “DHS scraps $2.4B cyber contract amid reorganization,” May 19, 2025 [18] Ibid. [19] Ibid. [20] Federal News Network, “Contractors angle for opportunities under DHS spending surge,” September 26, 2025 [21] Ibid. [22] Leidos, “Leidos awarded $918 million Department of Homeland Security network support contract,” September 7, 2023 [23] Washington Technology, “DOGE cancels Leidos contract,” February 26, 2025 [24] Federal News Network, “Contractors angle for opportunities under DHS spending surge,” September 26, 2025 [25] Federal Acquisition Regulation, various sections on emergency procurement authorities [26] Federal News Network, “Contractors angle for opportunities under DHS spending surge,” September 26, 2025 [27] Ibid. [28] American Immigration Council, “ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System, to Track Immigrants’ Movements,” August 22, 2025 [29] Ibid.

Prescott Water Deals Extract Wealth from Residents

A case study in public-private partnerships that transfer community resources to private developers while forcing existing residents to subsidize the arrangement.

The Infrastructure Cost Allocation

Prescott residents face rising water bills to pay for infrastructure they can’t use, while developers get guaranteed water for their projects. The Big Chino Water Ranch project, with costs now exceeding $261 million [1], splits expenses in a revealing way: twenty percent gets charged to existing residents through higher utility bills, while eighty percent falls to new home buyers through impact fees and infrastructure costs built into home sales [2]. The profit value of being able to develop thousands of tracts goes entirely to the developers.

This cost structure creates a fundamental unfairness. Existing residents pay approximately $52 million for infrastructure that actually limits community-wide water access while enabling massive private development. New residents pay market home prices that include the value of guaranteed water access funded by public infrastructure investment. Developers capture the increased land values created by public water allocation while recovering infrastructure costs through development sales.

Arizona Eco Development receives water allocation sufficient for 850 homes plus resort development, while all other development in Prescott receives limited annual allocations. The numbers reveal the wealth transfer: one private developer receives substantially more water than all other development projects in Prescott combined, while longtime residents fund twenty percent of the infrastructure making this possible without getting additional water allocation themselves.

This analysis supports productive profit from legitimate development and construction. The issue documented here is not profit itself, but extraction mechanisms that transfer publicly-created value to private interests while forcing communities to bear the costs.

Who Pays the Bills • Who Gets the Water • Community Burden • Environmental Destruction • Captured Government & Rejected Science • State-Enabled Extraction • Conclusion

Continue reading “Prescott Water Deals Extract Wealth from Residents”

Corpus Christi: Successful Defense Against Corporate Extraction

After a decade of community organizing, Corpus Christi City Council rejected a massive desalination plant that would have forced residents to subsidize industrial water supply while facing drought restrictions themselves. The September 4, 2025 decision came after a contentious 13-hour meeting with multiple arrests, ending a project whose cost estimates had exploded from $160 million in 2019 to $1.2 billion [1].

Residents still face the costs of defeat: they will pay $8 monthly for the next decade to cover $230 million in debt service for a project that produced nothing but planning documents [2].

The Wealth Extraction Model

The Inner Harbor Seawater Desalination Project exemplifies how corporate priorities drive public policy at community expense. This is a classic example of wealth extraction: socialize costs, privatize benefits [3].

Under the proposed funding structure, residents would have paid for the entire project through higher water bills and state taxpayer money, while industry captured the water supply. The financing included city borrowing repaid through resident water bills, state funding through the SWIFT program, and low-interest state loans [3]. If completed, residents would have paid $11 monthly through higher water rates to fund a facility producing 30 million gallons daily primarily for oil refineries, petrochemical plants, and hydrogen facilities [4].

City officials openly acknowledged the intended consumers were heavy industry, not residents [5]. Meanwhile, companies like Avina Clean Hydrogen secured rights to 5.5 million gallons per day while residents endured drought restrictions limiting lawn watering and car washing [6]. As one resident noted: “The City of Corpus Christi keeps telling us that we need to save water, but they don’t do anything to implement that on the industries. We’re having to take the burden of the drought while industries, who make profit from it, go on their merry way” [6].

Even with the project’s defeat, the pattern persists. Residents bear financial risks regardless of outcomes – they pay whether the corporate-serving project gets built or gets stopped.

Environmental and Community Costs

The plant would have discharged up to 96 million gallons daily of concentrated brine into Corpus Christi Bay, threatening marine ecosystems that support local fishing and tourism [7]. Research shows desalination brine can spread across the seabed for miles, harming sea grasses, coral, and fish populations. Studies by the Harte Research Institute concluded the discharge could raise salinity levels throughout the bay system with cascading ecological effects [8].

Latino communities, comprising 58% of Corpus Christi residents, face disproportionate impacts from industrial expansion [9]. These neighborhoods experience higher rates of health problems while bearing the environmental costs of projects that primarily benefit corporations. The plant would have enabled further petrochemical development in areas where residents report significant health concerns related to industrial pollution [9].

The Economic Arguments

Proponents framed the plant as essential for economic growth. Mayor Paulette Guajardo argued that “our ability to grow, attract new business, and create great jobs is dependent upon our ability to secure our water source” [10]. One council member claimed the city lost “up to $16 billion in new economic development projects” by rejecting the plant [2]. Industry representatives warned that without adequate water supply, “all these people in this room won’t be sitting here because they won’t have jobs” [11].

These promises came with substantial costs that would fall on residents and existing industries. The plant would have enabled a massive expansion of petrochemical facilities that already cause health problems in Latino neighborhoods. A retired fishing guide warned the project would “cripple all forms of tourism related to it, destroy our bays and will be a ridiculous financial burden” [12].

The fundamental question was whose economic interests would be prioritized: existing tourism and fishing industries that depend on a healthy bay ecosystem, or new petrochemical facilities that require massive water inputs but generate pollution and environmental degradation. The plant represented a bet that residents should subsidize the destruction of their current economy to enable a different one.

Community Victory

Environmental justice groups led by Chispa Texas, the Latino wing of the League of Conservation Voters, built a coalition that included Indigenous Peoples of the Coastal Bend, For the Greater Good, and other community organizations [13]. Their strategy focused on desalination as a “choke point” for industrial buildout – stopping water infrastructure that enables further corporate expansion [13].

The coalition organized hundreds of residents to attend public hearings, generated media coverage, and successfully stalled the project through sustained grassroots pressure. After the 13-hour city council meeting, the council voted 6-3 to cancel the contract [1].

The victory demonstrates that organized communities can defeat well-funded corporate projects when they expose the true costs and beneficiaries of proposed developments. The organizing success also shows how environmental justice connects to economic justice – protecting natural resources can protect communities from bearing costs while corporations capture benefits.

Ongoing Battles

The victory represents one success in a broader struggle. Four other desalination plants remain proposed for Corpus Christi Bay by the Port of Corpus Christi and other entities [14]. The Nueces River Authority now proposes an even larger facility producing 100-450 million gallons daily to serve regional industrial expansion [15].

These projects follow the same pattern: public infrastructure funded by residents to serve private industry. The fight continues as communities work to protect water resources and resist the corporate capture of essential public services. Political pressure from the state continues as well – Governor Greg Abbott’s chief of staff reportedly threatened to cut all state funding to Corpus Christi if it didn’t proceed with the plant [16].

The broader implications extend beyond Corpus Christi. As water becomes increasingly scarce due to climate change and industrial demand, the question of who pays for and who benefits from water infrastructure becomes critical. The Corpus Christi victory provides a model for communities facing similar struggles over the privatization of public resources.

Sources

[1] Corpus Christi City Council rejects desalination plant: https://www.kristv.com/news/local-news/in-your-neighborhood/corpus-christi/pressure-arrests-corpus-christi-council-reject-1-2-billion-inner-harbor-desalination-project

[2] Council member perspective on project defeat: https://www.kagstv.com/article/news/politics/inside-politics/texas-politics/councilmember-corpus-christi-risks-losing-industry-residents-desalination-plant-project-defeated/287-606a6cd8-5a5d-492e-8032-f00fdbc2f016

[3] The Great Transfer: American Government as a Wealth Extraction Machine: https://dittany.com/the-great-transfer-2025-government-wealth-extraction/

[4] Cost overruns and community impact: https://www.expressnews.com/business/article/corpus-christi-desalination-drought-industry-21029890.php

[5] Industrial water use vs. resident restrictions: https://www.texasobserver.org/corpus-christi-water-crisis-tesla-industrial-expansion/

[6] Industrial water use vs. resident restrictions: https://www.texasobserver.org/corpus-christi-water-crisis-tesla-industrial-expansion/

[7] Brine environmental impacts: https://pubs.acs.es/doi/10.1021/acs.est.3c07748

[8] EPA concerns about water quality: https://www.texastribune.org/2022/09/22/texas-desalination-plant-corpus-christi-tceq-epa/

[9] Environmental justice organizing: https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/2023-2-summer/feature/corpus-christi-texas-environmentalists-are-fighting-desalination

[10] Cost overruns and community impact: https://www.expressnews.com/business/article/corpus-christi-desalination-drought-industry-21029890.php

[11] Cost overruns and community impact: https://www.expressnews.com/business/article/corpus-christi-desalination-drought-industry-21029890.php

[12] Environmental justice organizing: https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/2023-2-summer/feature/corpus-christi-texas-environmentalists-are-fighting-desalination

[13] Coalition building and strategy: https://hivefund.org/news/communities-challenge-industry-power-on-the-gulf-coast

[14] Environmental justice organizing: https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/2023-2-summer/feature/corpus-christi-texas-environmentalists-are-fighting-desalination

[15] Ongoing industrial water demand: https://www.texastribune.org/2025/01/23/texas-corpus-christi-water-emergency-reservoirs/

[16] Texas Tribune, “Corpus Christi’s water supply is uncertain after City Council ends water treatment plans,” September 3, 2025: https://www.texastribune.org/2025/09/03/corpus-christi-desalination-water-plans-canceled/

The Great Transfer: American Government as a Wealth Extraction Machine

The 2025 Administration represents a brand new level of fraud and corruption. While the American government has always faced influence and capture by private interests, the 2025 administration appears to represent the most extensive and systematic version in modern history. We are witnessing the systematic transfer of all public assets—taxpayer money, public assets, government services, and democratic institutions—into the hands of selected politicians, the top 1%, and corporate special interests. This is government capture on an unprecedented scale.

Continue reading “The Great Transfer: American Government as a Wealth Extraction Machine”

Assault on America: Dismantling the Productive Economy

Current US Economic Policies: A Coordinated Attack on Productive Capacity

Key Findings

Current US economic policies represent a coordinated attack on four key parts of the economy: manufacturing, agriculture, energy competitiveness, and research expertise. This analysis examines the economic mechanisms through which these attacks will devastate rather than strengthen the American economy, contrary to stated objectives.

The multiplier effect is devastating. The assault on all these sectors at once sends cascading damage throughout the economy. Manufacturing tariffs on capital goods prevent the investment necessary for competitiveness. Losing farm workers reduces domestic production and increases dependence on imports. Energy policies that favor certain industries over what works best raise costs across all sectors. Cutting research funding and expelling international talent create brain drain precisely when technological competition intensifies globally.

These sectors create ripple effects throughout the economy and reinforce each other. Manufacturing generates $2.74-$3.60 in total economic activity for every dollar spent, while agricultural exports contributed $412 billion in total economic output in 2022 [1]. The destruction of productive capacity creates an economy focused on extracting wealth from what already exists rather than creating new wealth. This leaves the economy dependent on financial games and wealth extraction rather than businesses that actually produce things. When productive capacity disappears entirely, even these extractive activities lose their foundation and collapse, leaving no viable economic base.

When you destroy productive sectors (manufacturing, agriculture, energy competitiveness, research), you’re left with a much smaller economic base. This smaller base can’t employ large numbers of people in well-paying jobs or generate the innovations that keep an economy competitive globally.

No successful precedent exists for simultaneous attacks on all productive sectors in advanced economies. The resulting economic structure lacks the broad-based employment and innovation capacity necessary for growth or global competitiveness.

This analysis examines:

  • Manufacturing: How equipment tariffs destroy industrial investment
  • Agriculture: Workforce removal leaving crops unharvested
  • Energy: Blocking the cheapest available power sources
  • Research: Funding cuts creating brain drain during global competition
  • The cascade effect: How simultaneous attacks create reinforcing economic collapse

Continue reading “Assault on America: Dismantling the Productive Economy”

The Collapse of the Middle Class Is a National Security Issue

America’s strength—economic, civic, and military—has never come from wealth. It has always come from the people who keep the country running. The workers. The citizens. The millions building, repairing, transporting, teaching, learning, and growing.

We call it the “middle class,” but that label is fraying. Today, millions of full-time workers can’t afford an apartment, a car repair, or a future. Many can’t even afford to work—because without housing, transportation, or childcare, holding a job is out of reach. And many who once lived securely in the middle class have been pushed down into poverty—or worse, into homelessness.

This group—the ones doing the work, holding up the country—are the body of the nation. And when the body breaks down, the whole system fails.

When this group is stable, America is strong. When it collapses, the nation fractures. That’s not just an economic concern—or a “social issue.” This is a national security risk.

What Happened to the Middle

The post-WWII middle class wasn’t an accident. It was built through public investment, strong labor protections, and fair taxation. Wages grew with productivity. Families bought homes, sent kids to college, and looked to the future with confidence.

Over the past 40 years, that foundation was deliberately dismantled. Wages stagnated. Unions were weakened. Public services improved under some administrations—but are again under attack.

Today, the American worker is often one emergency away from collapse.

Far too many who should be part of the middle are shut out entirely—not because they won’t work, but because life is unaffordable. That’s not a moral failure. It’s a structural one.

And when enough people lose access to stability, the nation itself becomes brittle, unprepared, and more vulnerable.

Wealth Hasn’t Just Concentrated—It’s Been Extracted

This isn’t a story of the rich getting richer. It’s about wealth being pulled from the base and funneled upward.

Low wages and unstable jobs push workers onto public assistance—while corporations post record profits. For decades, companies have paid wages so low their workers qualify for food stamps—outsourcing labor costs to the public.

This is extraction and extortion, packaged as efficiency.

Now, with safety nets unraveling—the natural result of policies that weaken the American body—the illusion is collapsing. You can’t hollow out a nation’s base and expect it to stand. Without investment in the people who hold the country up, we are not a functioning society.

This Is a National Security Issue

Most people think of national security as weapons, borders, and foreign threats. But real security depends on internal strength—the ability to endure crisis, adapt, and stay united.

A strong middle class creates that strength.

It’s the middle class that staffs the military, drives ambulances, teaches the children, and keeps the lights on. It’s the middle class that responds to disasters and keeps the country moving. And when it’s stable, it believes in the system, participates in democracy, and pushes the country forward.

When that stability breaks down, the consequences ripple outward.

Fear replaces faith. Fear turns to anger.

When people are angry, everything is at risk:

— Trust evaporates—not just in government, but in daily life — Crisis management slows; people can’t recover if they’re already on edge — Authoritarian movements gain ground; strongmen sound convincing when systems feel hollow — Fear seeks a target, fueling division and scapegoating—fertile ground for propaganda

This is present reality.

You don’t achieve national security by concentrating wealth at the top. You create fragility—a country stretched thin, with too few holding up too much.

We Can Choose a More Secure Path

The strongest middle class in American history didn’t just magically appear. It came from deliberate choices:

  • Investment in education
  • Affordable housing
  • Labor protections
  • Public health
  • Fair taxation that prioritized broad prosperity

And for a time, it worked.

We built an economy that lifted people up—and supported those who couldn’t stand on their own.

We can choose that path again. This time, we don’t have to guess what works. We already know.

Rebuilding Strength from the Ground Up

Here’s what a strong, secure nation looks like:

— Wages and worker protections — Affordable housing and modern infrastructure — Healthcare built for health, not profit — Public education that opens doors — Fair taxation and closed loopholes — Responsive government that adapts to changing needs

These are pragmatic facts—grounded in economics, history, and common sense. They all serve one purpose: To restore strength to the part of America that makes it work.

In the end, national security isn’t about defense. It’s about durability.

A country that abandons its middle implodes. A country that invests in its people becomes unbreakable.

Let’s choose strength.
Let’s rebuild the middle.

Related Reading:

Explainer: Why a Strong, Healthy Middle Class Matters Opinion: America’s Middle Class Will Not Save Itself